Presentation Title: “The Possibility of Moral Therapy”

Abstract:

When biomedical human enhancement (hereafter “enhancement”) was first discussed, the distinction between enhancement and therapy was key. The objection was made that therapy is permissible, but enhancement is not. However, as the debate matured and a pro-enhancement camp or “transhumanists” developed, it became accepted that this distinction could not be made. Since 2008, the new idea of moral enhancement has emerged. Moral enhancement has received a variety of arguments against it. However, it seems that the opportunity to discuss the distinction between moral enhancement and moral therapy has been lost. This is because, at the time this distinction was discussed, physical and cognitive enhancement was in mind. Indeed, the distinction between moral enhancement and therapy would not be as clear as the distinction between physical enhancement and therapy. Thus, in moral matters, the domain of therapy by biomedical means does not seem to be even envisioned. Perhaps this is because both moral enhancement and therapy are not for the well-being of the individual, but for the well-being and safety of society and those around him or her. Against this background, in my presentation I will defend moral therapy. First, I will examine the distinction between moral enhancement and moral therapy and justify the theoretical possibility of moral therapy from a pragmatic perspective. To do so, I will appeal to analogies with correction in prisons, juvenile training school (“Shonen-in”) , and other correctional facilities. However, I will not draw a clear line between enhancement and therapy, but I will attempt to secure the realm of moral therapy from a pragmatic perspective. Next, I will examine specific methods of moral therapy. Since both enhancement and therapy are biomedical means, I have in mind the use of biomedical methods of correction, such as those used in prisons. When discussing moral enhancement, proponents tend to idealize it and argue that ideal moral enhancement, or ideally good moral enhancement is morally good. In this presentation, however, I will examine realistic method of moral therapy such as exogenous administration of neurohormones or brain-stimulation. Finally, I will examine possible objections. In discussing moral therapy, we will find that we can avoid some of the objections to enhancement in general or to moral enhancement in particular, such as the objection that morally enhanced people are exploited by those around them. In particular, value-based objections that appeal to naturalness, effort, and authenticity would be invalid for moral therapy. If we succeed in repelling these objections, we will have more or less succeeded in distinguishing enhancement from therapy.